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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This appeal arises out of the District Court's decision granting respondent Pocatello 
Health Services, Inc., d/b/a Pocatello Care and Rehabilitation Center's ("Pocatello Care and 
Rehab") Motion for Summary Judgment. In so ruling, the District Court exercised its role as 
gatekeeper with regard to expert testimony and held that Ms. Nield's experts' causation 
opinions were inadmissible because they were not arrived at by valid reasoning and 
methodology. The District Court then concluded that appellant Judy Nield ("Ms. Nield") was 
unable to establish, as a matter of law, the necessary causation between an alleged breach of the 
standard of care by Pocatello Care and Rehab and Ms. Nield's claimed damages. 
B. Factual Background 
1. Pocatello Care and Rehab 
Pocatello Care and Rehab is a skilled nursing facility located at 527 Memorial Drive in 
Pocatello, Idaho. (R., Vol. I, p. 12 at ~ 3.) From August 25, 2007 to December 3, 2007, Ms. 
Nield was a resident at Pocatello Care and Rehab for rehabilitation and wound care. (R., Vol. I, 
p. 2 at ~ III and p. 12 at ~ 3.) 
2. The events leading up to Ms. Nield's admission at Pocatello Care and Rehab 
On August 21, 2007, Ms. Nield was taken to the Emergency Department at Portneuf 
Medical Center after being found at home in a urine soaked bed with a fever and not wanting to 
get up. (R., Vol. II, pp. 259, 277.) Ms. Nield had multiple open wounds on her left leg that had 
been present for a couple of months and for which she had been receiving dressing changes 
from a home healthcare nurse. (R., Vol. II, pp. 254, 255.) Ms. Nield was also noted to have 
several ulcerations on her right leg. (R., Vol. II, p. 265.) Ms. Nield was admitted to Portneuf 
Medical Center and placed on intravenous antibiotics. (R., Vol. II, pp. 254-257.) 
During her admission to Portneuf Medical Center, Dr. Kenneth Newhouse prepared a 
detailed medical history of Ms. Nield. (R., Vol., II, pp. 264-266.) Dr. Newhouse noted Ms. 
Nield had a "fairly long complicated history" that included prior bilateral hip replacements, 
sciatic nerve injury, a fall in 2005 that left her unable to ambulate, chronic cellulitis in her lower 
extremities, possible Charcot disease in her left leg and pain in her artificial hips. (ld.) 
On August 25, 2007, Ms. Nield was discharged from Portneuf Medical Center and 
admitted to Pocatello Care and Rehab. (R., Vol. II, pp. 273-275; R., Vol. I, p. 2 at ~ III.) 
3. The wound culture taken at Portneuf Medical Center 
On August 21, 2007, a wound culture was taken from Ms. Nield's "WOUND, LEFT 
LEG" at Portneuf Medical Center, which revealed moderate gram positive cocci, moderate 
coag-neg staph species, moderate beta hemolytic streptococci, not Group A, B or D, and light 
klebsiella pneumoniae. (R., Vol. II, p. 261-262.) The laboratory report indicated the wound 
culture was taken from a single wound on Ms. Nield's left leg, although it does not identify 
which one of the four wounds was cultured. (Id.; R., Vol. III, p. 598 (referencing four wounds 
at the time of her admission to Pocatello Care and Rehab).) Wound cultures were not taken 
from Ms. Nield's right leg open wounds and prior to her discharge from Portneuf Medical 
Center, there is no documentation of additional wound cultures performed. (R., Vol. II, pp. 261-
2 
262 (representing the only wound culture result on her open wounds during Ms. Nield's August 
21,2007 August 25,2007 admission at PortneufMedical Center).) 
4. Ms. Nield's admission and stay at Pocatello Care and Rehab 
On August 25, 2007, Ms. Nield was discharged from Portneuf Medical Center and 
admitted to Pocatello Care and Rehab. (R., Vol. II, pp. 273-275, Vol. III, p. 596, and Vol. I, p. 
2, ~ 3.) Ms. Nield was placed in a private room in the rehabilitation section of Pocatello Care 
and Rehab. (R., Vol. II, p. 316, 11. 118:13-24.) Prior to her admission to Pocatello Care and 
Rehab, Ms. Nield was not screened for MRS A or pseudomonas, as the standard of care did not 
require MRSA screens at that time. (R., Vol. II, pp. 212-213, ~ 14.) 
During her admission to Pocatello Care and Rehab, Ms. Nield left the facility on various 
occasions, which included being taken to PortneufMedical Center on August 27,2007 to have a 
PICC line inserted (R., Vol. II, pp. 344-345), leaving the facility to have dental work done on 
October 12, 2007 (R., Vol. II, p. 347), and visiting Portneuf Medical Center's Gift shop prior to 
the date her wound culture indicated she had MRSA or pseudomonas. (R., Vol. II, p.331, ll. 
178:22-179:19.) 
She also had numerous family members and friends visit her (Barbie Girard, Karen 
Morasko, Gary and Julie Toupe, Kenny and Diane Balls, Mannie Perez, Milt Escobar, Vic and 
Joan Adams, Janna Leo, Laurie Bills and Jay Cunningham) (R., Vol. II, pp. 322-323, ll. 142:10-
147:6) and was seen and treated by numerous medical professionals that were not employed by 
Pocatello Care and Rehab, including Dr. Routson, Dr. Hoff, Dr. Jones, and Nurse Practitioner 
Diana B. Krawtz. (R., Vol. II, pp. 349-360.) 
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From her admission to November 9, 2007, Ms. Nield's wounds made significant 
improvement. (R., Vol. II, pp. 362-367.) On November 9, 2007, a wound culture was taken by 
Portneuf Wound Care and Hyperbaric Center from Ms. Nield's left leg. (R., Vol. II, pp. 369-
372.) The wound culture was positive for moderate coag-positive staphylococcus, MRSA, 
moderate pseudomonas aeruginosa and light klebsiella pneumoniae. (ld.) 
Ms. Nield was placed on IV antibiotics following her MRSA and pseudomonas 
diagnosis. (R., Vol. II, p. 374.) It was further determined that her Monday through Friday 
wound dressing change routine would be resumed. (R., Vol. II, p. 352.) 
On November 25, 2007, Ms. Nield completed her antibiotic treatment. (R., Vol. II, pp. 
376-377.) On November 27, 2007, another wound culture was taken at Portneuf Medical 
Center and the pathology report identifIed light MRSA. CR. Vol. II, p. 379.) The pathology 
report did not indicate the presence of pseudomonas. (ld.) Ms. Nield was placed on another 
course of antibiotics to treat her MRSA infection. (R., Vol. II, p. 381.) 
On December 3, 2007, Ms. Nield left Pocatello Care and Rehab because her Medicare 
coverage was expiring, and she was concerned about losing her assets if she remained at the 
facility. (R. Vol. II, p. 331, 11.181:11-25.) 
5. Post-Pocatello Care and Rehab (December 3,2007 to June 2009) 
After leaving Pocatello Care and Rehab, Ms. Nield returned to her home, where she was 
cared for by Milt Escobar, Creekside Home Health, and the Wound Care and Hyperbaric 
Center. CR., Vol. II, p. 381; R., Vol. II. p. 325, 11. 154:20-156:7.) 
On January 18, 2008, Ms. Nield's wounds were re-cultured, and the accompanying 
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pathology report identified heavy MRSA. CR., Vol. II, p. 383.) The report did not identify the 
presence of pseudomonas. (Jd.) 
On February 12, 2008, Ms. Nield was seen by Dr. Michael Baker from the Portneuf 
Wound Care and Hyperbaric Center. Dr. Baker noted no evidence of significant infection. CR., 
Vol. II, p. 385.) On February 25, 2008, it was noted Ms. Nield was wrapping "stones & other 
stuff' into her wounds in an attempt to heal them. CR., Vol. II, p. 388.) 
On March 13, 2008, another wound culture was taken from Ms. Nield's left leg. CR., 
Vol. II, pp. 390-392.) The culture showed moderate gram positive cocci, moderate coag-
positive staphylococcus, moderate MRSA, moderate Group D enterococcus and moderate 
enterococcus faeccalis. (ld.) Pseudomonas was not identified. (Jd.) 
On March 20, 2008, Ms. Nield was admitted to Portneuf Medical Center for treatment of 
osteomyelitis in her left foot. CR., Vol. II, pp. 394-396.) Ms. Nield was discharged from 
Portneuf Medical Center on March 23, 2008, and was transferred to Promise Hospital in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. CR., Vol. II, pp. 398-400.) 
On April 2, 2008, Ms. Nield underwent a left leg below knee amputation at Salt Lake 
Regional Medical Center as a result of osteomyelitis of her left foot and ankle and ulcers on her 
lower left leg. CR., Vol. II, pp. 402-403.) 
On May 2, 2008, Ms. Nield's right hip was aspirated and cultured; the culture grew out 
pseudomonas. CR., Vol. II, pp. 405-406.) The newly identified pseudomonas was susceptible to 
different antibiotics than the pseudomonas strain Ms. Nield was diagnosed with at Pocatello 
Care and Rehab. CR., Vol. II, p. 215,'; 27.) 
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On May 12, 2008, Ms. Nield underwent a right total hip explant with placement of an 
antibiotic spacer at Intermountain Medical Center. (R., Vol. II, pp. 408-410.) 
6. Ms. Nield's claims and identified experts 
Ms. Nield alleges that she contracted MRSA and pseudomonas at Pocatello Care and 
Rehab and that she contracted those infections due to Pocatello Care and Rehab's alleged 
breach of the standard of care.! CR., Vol. I, p. 7.) Ms. Nield further claims that all of her post 
Pocatello Care and Rehab medical expenses, including the left below knee amputation and right 
hip revision surgery, were proximately caused by her alleged contraction of MRSA and 
pseudomonas at Pocatello Care and Rehab. (R., Vol. VI, pp. 1044-1045, ~ 8.) 
Despite Ms. Nield's claims related to MRSA and pseudomonas infections, Ms. Nield did 
not identify an infectious disease physician as an expert in this case and instead identified Dr. 
Hugh Selznick, an orthopedic surgeon, Suzanna Frederick a registered nurse, and Sidney 
Gerber, a licensed nursing facility administrator. CR., Vol. VI, pp. 1027-1029, 1042-1046, and 
1095-1097. ) 
7. Pocatello Care and Rehab's infectious disease expert and his opinions 
In addition to other experts, Pocatello Care and Rehab disclosed Thomas Coffman, M.D. 
("Dr. Coffman"). (R., Vol. I, pp. 19-51.) Dr. Coffman is a physician with over 20 years 
specializing in infectious disease. CR., Vol. II, p. 210, ~ 2.) He is board certified in internal 
I Standard of care is not an issue on appeal, as it was not a subject of the Motion for Summary 
Judgment given there are too many disputed material facts surrounding that matter. As such, 
Pocatello Care and Rehab is not, for purposes of the appeal only, offering detailed evidence to 
contradict plaintiffs' factual allegations related to whether Pocatello Care and Rehab breached 
the applicable standard of care. 
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medicine and infectious disease and at the time of his Affidavit was the Chief of Staff at St. 
Luke's Regional Medical Center, the Chairman of the Infection Control Committee at St. 
Luke's Regional Medical Center, and the Co-Chairman of Infection Control for Saint 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center. (Jd.) 
Dr. Coffman provided an affidavit in support of Pocatello Care and Rehab's Motion for 
Summary Judgment explaining what MRSA and pseudomonas bacteria are, how they are 
contracted, how they are screened and tested for, and that based upon the available evidence it 
was not possible to state to a reasonable degree of medical certainty when or how Ms. Nield 
contracted MRSA or pseudomonas. (R., Vol. II, pp. 209-217.) 
Dr. Coffman testified to the following with respect to MRSA, which was not 
contradicted, opposed or even addressed by Ms. Nield's experts: 
• Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus is a strain of staphylococcus aureus 
bacteria that is resistant to certain types of antibiotics. (R., Vol. II, p. 21 0, ~ 4.) 
• MRSA is not more virulent than other strains of staphylococcus, but is instead, 
resistant to treatment with certain types of antibiotics. (!d.) 
• A person may have MRSA but not show signs or symptoms of infection. (R. 
Vol. II, p. 210, ~ 5.) A person who has MRSA but is not showing signs of 
infection is MRSA colonized or, otherwise stated, a carrier. (Id.) A common 
location for MRS A colonization is in a person's nostrils. (Id.) MRSA can also 
colonize in a person's respiratory tract, urinary tract, open wounds and catheters. 
(Id.) 
• Most people who are colonized with MRSA do not end up with MRSA 
infections and, therefore, show no signs of being colonized with MRSA. (R., 
Vol. II, p. 211, ~ 10.) 
• MRSA is ubiquitous in health care facilities, including skilled nursing facilities 
and in fact, some studies indicate that 25% of patients at long term care facilities 
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are colonized with MRSA. (R., Vol. II, p. 211, ,; 7.) 
• MRSA may be transmitted through numerous means, including contact with 
someone who has an active infection, contact with someone who is a carrier, and 
contact with an object that has been contaminated with MRSA. (R., Vol. II, p. 
211,'; 8.) 
• Contact can include actual physical touching, or being in such close proximity to 
a carrier that a person breathes in the tiny droplets expelled by the carrier while 
breathing, coughing or sneezing. (R., Vol. II, p. 211, ,; 8.) Contact with a 
contaminated object may include touching a surface or object that was touched 
by someone who is MRSA infected or MRSA colonized. (R., Vol. II, p. 211, ,; 
8.) 
• Risk factors associated with susceptibility to MRSA infection include 
compromised immune system, compromised venous and arterial function, 
chronic wet wounds, older than 60 years of age, diabetes, and a history of 
admissions to medical facilities. (R., Vol. II, p. 211, ,; 10.) 
• Testing to determine whether a person is a MRSA carrier (i.e., not exhibiting any 
infection symptoms) involves screening a patient's nares (nostrils), rectal or 
perineal areas for MRS A colonization or other methods to determine whether a 
person who is asymptomatic may still be MRS A colonized. (R., Vol. II, p. 212, 
,; 13.) 
• MRSA screening is not a foolproof measure to identify carriers of MRSA. Nares 
screenings only identify 60-70% of MRS A colonized individuals, while rectal 
and perineal screening may identify an additional 10-15% of MRSA carriers. 
(R., Vol. II, p. 212,'; 13.) 
• Testing to determine whether a person has a MRSA infection includes taking a 
wound culture from the suspected infection area via a swab, and placing the 
collected material in a sterile container. (R., Vol. II, pp. 211-212, ,; 12.) The 
different micro-organisms within the culture are then separated. (Id.) The two or 
three most dominant micro-organisms are then spread over the surface of 
different types of culture plates, placed in an incubator and grown out for a 
period of time. (Id.) The lab technician does not grow out every micro-organism 
from the culture, which in a patient like Ms. Nield on August 21, 2007, may 
include dozens and dozens. (Id.; R. Vol. II, p. 214, ,; 24.) Instead, a technician 
will separate two or three of the most dominant micro-organisms for purposes of 
growing them out and identifying them. (Id.) As such, MRSA and other 
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infections can be present in a culture but not be identified because not all 
microorganisms are grown out, tested and identified, which is a false negative. 
(Id.) 
• A resident of a skilled nursing facility such as Pocatello Care and Rehab can 
become MRSA colonized or infected in the absence of any negligence on behalf 
of the facility. CR., Vol. II, p. 211, ~ 11.) 
Dr. Coffman's affidavit provided the District Court with the following information 
regarding pseudomonas aeruginosa, which was not opposed, contradicted, or even addressed by 
Ms. Nield's experts: 
• Pseudomonas is a common aerobic, gram-negative bacterium of relatively low 
virulence. CR., Vol. II, p. 213, ~ 15.) Pseudomonas is found in plants, soil, water 
and animals. CR., Vol. II, p. 213, ~ 17.) Pseudomonas is resistant to various forms 
of antibiotics. CR., Vol. II, p. 215, ~ 17.) 
• Pseudomonas is found in the colon of approximately 10% of the at large 
popUlation. Pseudomonas is common in medical care settings and nature. CR., 
Vol. II, p. 213, ~~ 15 and 17.) 
• Like MRSA, people can carry pseudomonas without showing any signs or 
symptoms of infection. Generally healthy people do not normally become 
infected with pseudomonas. (R., Vol. II, p. 213, ~ 16.) 
• Testing to determine whether a person has a pseudomonas infection is the same 
as testing for MRS A and may result in a false negative. CR., Vol. II, pp. 211-212, 
~ 12; p. 214, ~ 24.) 
• Pseudomonas can be transmitted through direct contact with water that has been 
exposed to the bacteria, inhalation of pseudomonas aerosols, eating raw 
vegetables that are infected with pseudomonas and direct contact with 
pseudomonas infected individuals or contaminated surfaces. (R., Vol. II, p. 213, 
~~ 19-20.) 
• A resident of a skilled nursing facility such as Pocatello Care and Rehab can 
become infected with pseudomonas in the absence of any negligence on behalf 
of the facility. CR., Vol. II, pp. 213-214, ~ 21.) 
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C. Procedural Background 
Pocatello Care and Rehab agrees with Ms. Nield's recitation of the procedural history of 
this case. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Whether the District Court erred in misapplying the summary judgment 
standard by improperly weighing the evidence and failing to give Ms. Nield 
all reasonable inferences from the record. 
B. Whether the District Court erred in misapplying the summary judgment 
standard by requiring Ms. Nield to show that she may have been a carrier 
of MRSA and PA but was not infected at the time of her admission; 
requiring Ms. Nield to show why the wound culture would not have 
produced a false negative; and requiring Ms. Nield to show she could only 
have contracted MRSA and P A while admitted at PCRC's facility. 
C. Whether the District Court erred in misapplying the substantial factor test 
incorrectly concluding Ms. Nield's experts did not address when, where or 
how she contracted MRSA and P A and rule out the other factors that could 
have been a substantial factor in causing Ms. Nield to contract MRSA and 
PA. 
D. Whether Ms. Nield is entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal, 
pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 
41. 
III. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Pocatello Care and Rehab brought its summary judgment motion in this case based upon 
Ms. Nield's inability to establish the necessary causation for her damages. (R., Vol. I, p. 183.) 
In bringing that Motion, Pocatello Care and Rehab submitted the affidavit of an infectious 
disease expert, Dr. Thomas Coffman, in support of its motion. (R., Vol. II, pp. 209-217.) Dr. 
Coffman's affidavit explained how MRSA and pseudomonas were ubiquitous in the 
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community, how they are contracted, carried and transferred, how these bacteria are tested and 
screened for, and that based upon the available evidence it was impossible to determine to a 
reasonable degree of medical certainty when, where or how Ms. Nield contracted MRSA and 
pseudomonas. (Jd.) 
Ms. Nield moved to continue the hearing in order to obtain an affidavit from an 
infectious disease expert, but failed to provide such affidavit.2 (R., Vol. III pp. 526-527 and 
529.) Rather, Ms. Nield relied upon conclusory and speculative affidavits from an orthopedic 
physician, a nurse and a nursing home administrator stating Ms. Nield contracted MRSA and 
pseudomonas as a result of breaches of the standard of care by Pocatello Care and Rehab. (R., 
Vol. VI, pp. 1027-1029, 1042-1046 and 1095-1097.) Ms. Nield's expert witnesses' affidavit 
testimony failed to identify scientifically sound reasoning or methodology in support of their 
causation opinions. (Jd.) 
Prior to liberally construing the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor 
of Ms. Nield, the District Court exercised its role as gatekeeper with regard to the admissibility 
of expert testimony. (R., Vol., VII, p. 1292.) In doing so, the District Court determined Dr. 
Selznick's (and all of Ms. Nield's experts) causation testimony was based on unsound reasoning 
and methodology and was without merit. (R., Vol. VII, pp. 1236-1237.) The Court did not 
impermissibly weigh these experts' affidavits against Pocatello Care and Rehab's expert's 
affidavit, but rather, appropriately determined Dr. Selznick, Ms. Frederick and Mr. Gerber's 
2 Prior to oral argument, Ms. Nield's counsel indicated that as to her Motion to Continue, Ms. 
Nield obtained the necessary affidavits despite the fact no affidavit from an infectious disease 
expert was produced. (Tr., 11. 8:18-22.) 
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expert causation opinions were inadmissible and would not be considered for purposes of 
consideration in the summary judgment motion. (Id.; R., Vol. VII, pp. 1292-1294.) 
Without admissible competent expert testimony to establish causation, the District Court 
appropriately granted Pocatello Care and Rehab's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The District Court's decision granting summary judgment should be affirmed, as the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in exercising its role as a gatekeeper with regard to 
admissible evidence and appropriately held Ms. Nield's experts' opinions regarding causation 
were not arrived at through scientifically sound reasoning and methodology. 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR APPEAL 
"The admissibility of expert testimony is a matter committed to the discretion of the trial 
court, and the court's ruling will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion." Jones v. 
Crawforth, 147 Idaho 11, 17, 205 P .3d 660, 666 (2009) quoting Athay v. Stacey, 142 Idaho 360, 
366, 128 P.3d 897, 903 (2005). "[T]he trial court has the discretion to determine both whether 
the expert is qualified as an expert in the field and whether there is a scientific basis for the 
expert's opinion." Swallow v. Emergency Medicine of Idaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589, 593, 67 P.3d 
68, 72 (2003). 
"An abuse of discretion review requires a three-part inquiry: (1) whether the lower court 
rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the 
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific 
choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. A district 
court's evidentiary rulings will not be disturbed by this Court unless there has been a clear 
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abuse of discretion." Suhadolnik v. Pressman, 151 Idaho 110, 115,254 P.3d 11,16 (2011) 
citing McDaniel v. Inland Northwest Renal Care Group-Idaho, LLC, 144 Idaho 219, 221-22, 
159 P.3d 856,858-59 (2007). 
When reviewing a district court's decision on summary judgment, the Idaho Supreme 
Court's "standard of review is the same as the standard used by the trial court ruling on the 
motion for summary jUdgment." Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 
394,224 P.3d 458,461 (2008). 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court appropriately determined this case required expert testimony to 
establish causation. 
1. Expert testimony is required to establish causation in the instant action 
because the medical and scientific principles involved are beyond the 
knowledge of the average lay person. 
In the instant action, the District Court held that "[t]he process in which people contract 
infectious diseases is outside the scope of knowledge of a jury and requires the assistance of 
experts to explain how infections are contracted and spread." (R., Vol. VII, p. 1235.) As 
explained below, this was a proper ruling. 
The question of proximate cause "is one of fact and almost always for the jury." Cramer 
v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 875, 204 P.3d 508, 515 (2009). "Although the Idaho Rules of 
Evidence do not require expert testimony to establish causation in medical malpractice cases, 
such testimony is often necessary given the nature of the cases. Expert testimony in medical 
malpractice cases is generally required because 'the causative factors are not ordinarily within 
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the knowledge or experience of laymen composing the jury. '" Coombs v. Curnow, 148 Idaho 
129,140,219 P.3d 453,464 (2009), quoting Flowerdew v. Warner, 90 Idaho 164, 170,409 P.2d 
110, 113 (1965). In Swallow v. Emergency Medicine of Idaho, PA, the Court cited with 
approval Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 210, 214, 796 P.2d 87, 91 (1990)(citing 31A 
Am. Jur.2d, Expert & Opinion Evidence, section 207) as follows: 
Where the subject matter regarding the cause of disease, injury, or death 
of a person is wholly scientific or so far removed from the usual and 
ordinary experience of the average person that expert knowledge is 
essential to the formation of an intelligent opinion, only an expert can 
competently give opinion evidence as to the cause of death, disease or 
physical condition. 
138 Idaho 589, 598, 67 P.3d 68, 77 (2003). 
In the instant action, issues and matters involved with this case including MRSA, 
pseudomonas and infectious disease medicine are scientific in nature and far removed from the 
usual and ordinary experience of the average lay person. The ordinary layperson does not have 
experience or knowledge with regard to the characteristics of MRSA or pseudomonas or how 
these bacteria are carried, transferred, identified or treated. As such, the District Court correctly 
determined expert testimony was necessary to establish causation in the instant matter. 
2. Causation is not reasonably and naturally inferable from the chain of 
circumstances in this case. 
Ms. Nield argues expert testimony is not required to establish causation in this case 
because a jury can naturally and reasonably infer Ms. Nield contracted MRSA and 
pseudomonas while at Pocatello Care and Rehab based upon the chain of circumstances leading 
up to her positive wound culture test in November 2007. However, as explained by Dr. 
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Coffman's testimony, a juror cannot reasonably and naturally infer Ms. Nield contracted MRSA 
and pseudomonas as a result of the alleged negligence of Pocatello Care and Rehab. 
In certain cases, the chain of circumstances allows a jury to reasonably and naturally 
infer that a plaintiffs damages were proximately caused by a defendant's breach of the standard 
of care without direct expert testimony. See Coombs v. Curnow, 148 Idaho 129,219 P.3d 453 
(2009); Weeks v. Eastern Idaho Health Services, 143 Idaho 834, 153 P.3d 1180 (2007), 
Sheridan v. Sf. Luke's Regional Medical Center, 135 Idaho 775, 25 P.3d 88 (2001). 
In Sheridan, the plaintiffs sued a hospital arguing its negligent care of their son's 
jaundice and bilirubin levels lead to his permanent and irreparable brain damage. One of the 
issues in Sheridan was whether direct expert testimony was required to establish proximate 
cause. In holding the district court appropriately denied the hospital's motion for directed 
verdict on this issue, the Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed that proximate cause may be shown 
from a "chain of circumstances from which the ultimate fact required to be established is 
reasonably and naturally inferable." Id. 135 Idaho at 785, 25 P.3d at 98. The Court went on to 
discuss the specific chain of circumstances that allowed a jury to reasonably and naturally infer 
that the hospital's actions proximately caused plaintiffs' son's injuries: 
(1) "There was testimony that jaundice showing within the first 24 hours is 
pathologic and required further evaluation such as a serum bilirubin measurement;" 
(2) "high bilirubin levels can be successfully treated by the use of bili lights and 
blood exchange transfusions;" 
(3) there was no dispute that jaundice was present within 24 hours of birth; 
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(4) testimony established the hospital breached the standard of care when nurses 
failed to notify physicians of jaundice and discharged the child without informing the 
parents that the jaundice was abnormal; 
(5) the child was rehospitalized with hyperbilirubinemia and kernicterus (a form of 
cerebral palsy associated with a neonatal history of elevated bilirubin). 
Id., 135 Idaho at 786, 25 P.3d at 99. Although the plaintiffs failed to come forward with direct 
expert testimony that the hospital's negligence had proximately caused the son's injuries, the 
Court affirmed the lower court's determination that the above chain of circumstances and 
testimony in that case allowed a jury to reasonably and naturally infer that the son's damages 
were caused by the hospital's breaches of the standard of care. 
Similarly, in Weeks v. Eastern Idaho Health Services, a woman was killed when an 
infusion of medications was mistakenly given through a catheter connected to her brain instead 
of by IV. In granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the district court excluded 
causation testimony from plaintiffs' expert witness, Dr. Smith, holding his testimony was not 
based upon sound scientific principles. 143 Idaho at 837, 153 P.3d at 1183. In essence, Dr. 
Smith testified it was possible the build-up of intracranial pressure from the infusion of fluid 
killed the patient, or that the effect of the medications being infused on the brain killed the 
patient, and it was not possible to determine which of those two (or both) factors killed the 
patient. Id. 143 Idaho at 839, 153 P.3d at 1185. Dr. Smith provided medical literature in 
support of his theory regarding intracranial pressure, but no medical literature in support for his 
opinion that the effect of the chemicals on the brain may have killed the patient. Id. Because 
Dr. Smith could not separate the potential causes of death (fluid build-up, chemical mixture or 
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combination of both) and had no medical support for the chemical impact theory, his testimony 
was excluded by the lower court. ld. 
On appeal, the Court found that the lower court abused its discretion when it excluded 
Dr. Smith's causation testimony. The Court did so based on the following two grounds: (1) the 
expert's theory regarding intracranial pressure was supported by known medical research and 
studies and (2) although his theory that infusion of these medications into her brain could have 
killed her was not supported by medical literature, Dr. Smith was qualified to opine that this 
chain of circumstances (infusion of medications intended for an IV being sent to her brain) was 
a substantial factor in causing her damages. ld. 143 Idaho at 839,153 P.3d at 1185-86. 
The instant action is distinguishable from Sheridan and Weeks in that the chain of 
circumstances and admissible testimony does not allow a jury to reasonably and naturally infer 
Ms. Nield contracted MRS A or pseudomonas as a result of alleged breaches of the standard of 
care by Pocatello Care and Rehab. In Sheridan, the admissible facts and testimony established: 
(1) the child was jaundiced and exhibiting high bilirubin levels within 24 hours of birth; (2) high 
bilirubin levels can be successfully treated if known; (3) nurses breached standard of care by 
failing to notify physicians of high bilirubin levels and discharged patient; and (4) the child 
returned with irreparable brain damage associated with high bilirubin levels. In Weeks, there 
were medications intended to be given by IV being sent to a patient's brain via catheter and 
subsequent brain damage. There is no such clear factual progression with an obvious result at 
the end in this instant action. 
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Ms. Nield argued the chain of events leading up to her positive MRSA and pseudomonas 
test on November 9,2007 allowed her experts to reasonably and naturally infer proximate cause 
in this case, i.e., that she contracted MRSA and pseudomonas as a result of negligence on the 
part of Pocatello Care and Rehab. CR., Vol. VI, pp. 1042-1046.) Specifically Ms. Nield argues 
the negative wound culture test on August, 21, 2007 and allegations of negligent care and the 
positive wound culture test on November 9, 2007 would allow a jury to reasonably and 
naturally infer the alleged negligent care provided by Pocatello Care and Rehab was the 
proximate cause of her contraction of MRSA and pseudomonas. CR., Vol. III, pp. 556-557; 
Appellant's Opening Brief on Appeal, p. 21.) As discussed below, however, such facts do not 
give rise to a reasonable and natural inference. 
a. A negative wound culture on August 21, 2007 does not allow a jury to 
naturally or reasonably infer Mrs. Nield did not have MRSA or 
pseudomonas at the time she was admitted to Pocatello Care and Rehab 
on August 25, 2007. 
Again, the sole basis for Ms. Nield's experts' opinion that Ms. Nield did not have 
MRSA or pseudomonas at the time she was admitted to Pocatello Care and Rehab is a wound 
culture done on August 21, 2007 that did not identify MRSA or pseudomonas. CR., Vol. VI, p. 
1043, ~ 5.) Ms. Nield argues her experts were entitled to rely on this test for the conclusion Ms. 
Nield did not have MRSA or pseudomonas on August 25, 2007; however, Dr. Coffman 
provided a litany of medically and scientifically reliable reason~ why Ms. Nield's experts' 
opinions do not meet the requirements ofIdaho Rule of Evidence 702. 
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The limitations of a wound culture test: As fully explained by the only infectious 
disease expert involved in this matter, a wound culture only tests for the presence of bacteria in 
the wound cultured, and if a person had bacteria in other wounds, or was colonized in other 
places, a wound culture would not identify the bacteria. (R., Vol. II, pp. 210-213, ~~ 5, 12, 13, 
16 and 20.) Ms. Nield's experts did not dispute, oppose or even address these opinions. (R., 
Vol. VI, pp. 1027-1029, 1042-1046 and 1095-1097.) 
Only one of Ms. Nield's left leg wounds and none of the wounds on her right leg were 
cultured: It is undisputed Ms. Nield had several open wounds on her left leg as of August 21, 
2007. (R., Vol. II, pp. 254-255.) It is further undisputed Ms. Nield had wounds on her right leg 
as well. (R., Vol. II, p. 265.) The Clinical Laboratory Report dated August 21, 2007 states the 
source of the culture was "WOUND, LEFT LEG." (R., Vol. II, p. 261.) The Clinical 
Laboratory Report does not indicate more than one wound was cultured on her left leg. The 
Clinical Laboratory Report does not indicate any of the wounds on her right leg were tested. 
(Id.) As such, the negative wound care test result has no bearing on whether Ms. Nield had 
MRSA or pseudomonas in any of the wounds that were not tested. (R., Vol. II, pp. 211, 212 
and 214, ~~ 12 and 24.). Ms. Nield's experts did not dispute, oppose or even address these 
opinions. (R., Vol. VI, pp. 1027-1029, 1042-1046 and 1095-1097.) 
Potential for a false negative test on August 21, 2007: Dr. Coffman explained the very 
real possibility of a false negative result from the wound culture test on November 21, 2007 
based upon Ms. Nield's condition. Dr. Coffman explained how wound cultures are performed, 
how Ms. Nield likely had dozens and dozens of bacteria in her wounds due to having been 
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found with wet open wounds while lying in an urine soaked bed, and that only one or two of the 
most dominant bacteria are grown out by the technician performing the wound culture. (R., 
Vol. II, pp. 211-212, 214, ~~ 12 and 24.) As such, it is possible Ms. Nield's cultured wound did 
in fact contain MRSA and/or pseudomonas, but the test failed to identify such bacteria. (Jd.) 
Ms. Nield's experts did not dispute, oppose or even address these opinions. (R., Vol. VI, pp. 
1027-1029, 1042-1046 and 1095-1097.) Further, Ms. Nield did not provide an affidavit from 
the technician who performed the test to dispute the procedure technicians follow in performing 
these wound culture tests. 
The ubiquitous nature of both MRSA and pseudomonas: MRSA and pseudomonas are 
not rare bacteria and are in fact present both inside and outside of health care facilities. (R., Vol. 
II, pp. 210-211, 213, ~~ 4,7,15,16 and 17.) Studies indicate 25% of long term care residents 
are MRSA colonized and 10% of the population at large is pseudomonas colonized. (R., Vol. II, 
pp. 211, 213, ~~ 7 and 16.) Ms. Nield's experts did not dispute, oppose or even address these 
opinions. (R., Vol. VI, pp. 1027-1029, 1042-1046 and 1095-1097.) 
People can be carriers of MRSA and pseudomonas without showing any signs or 
symptoms: It is common for people to be colonized (or be a carrier) with MRSA or 
pseudomonas without showing any signs or symptoms of infection. (R., Vol. II, pp. 210 and 
213, ~~ 5 and 16.) People who are colonized with MRS A may have the bacteria in their nares, 
respiratory tract, urinary tract, open wounds or catheters. (R., Vol. II, p. 210, ~ 5.) People who 
are colonized with pseudomonas may have the bacteria in their colons. (R., Vol. II, p. 213, ~ 
16.) It is not possible to determine if a person is MRSA colonized without performing a MRSA 
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screen (which still only catches between 60-70% of colonized individuals). (R., Vol. II, pp. 
212-213, " 13-14.) Ms. Nield's experts did not dispute, oppose or even address these opinions. 
(R., Vol. VI, pp. 1027-1029, 1042-1046 and 1095-1097.) 
Ms. Nield was not screened for MRSA: There are no laboratory reports indicating Ms. 
Nield was screened for MRS A prior to her admission to Pocatello Care and Rehab. (R., Vol. II, 
pp. 212-213,,14; R., Vol. II, pp. 244-246; R., Vol. II, p. 261-262.) Ms. Nield's experts did not 
dispute, oppose or even address these opinions in their affidavits. (R., Vol. VI, pp. 1027-1029, 
1042-1046 and 1095-1097.) 
Ms. Nield's wound on her left leg was not recultured after August 21, 2007 prior to her 
admission to Pocatello Care and Rehab: Ms. Nield could have been exposed to MRSA and/or 
pseudomonas while admitted to Portneuf Medical Center in the remaining four days of her stay. 
(R., Vol. III, pp. 582-594)(entirety of wound culture tests performed on Ms. Nield while at 
Pocatello Care and Rehab). 
Based upon the above undisputed facts, a Juror (and Ms. Nield's experts) cannot 
reasonably and naturally infer Ms. Nield did not have MRSA or pseudomonas at the time she 
was admitted to Pocatello Care and Rehab based solely upon her single negative wound culture. 
There are simply too many variables and scientific/medical principles that preclude such 
assumptions and conclusions. 
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b. A posItIve wound culture report for MRSA and pseudomonas on 
November 9, 2007 does not allow a juror to reasonably and naturally 
infer Ms. Nield contracted these bacteria at Pocatello Care and Rehab as a 
result of Pocatello Care and Rehab's alleged negligence. 
Ms. Nield argues it is possible for a juror to reasonably and naturally infer she 
contracted MRSA and pseudomonas as a result of the alleged negligence of Pocatello Care and 
Rehab based upon her negative wound culture test on August 21, 2007, allegations of breaches 
of the standard of care on behalf of Pocatello Care and Rehab and a positive test for MRSA and 
pseudomonas after her admission. As discussed immediately above, one cannot reasonably and 
naturally infer Ms. Nield did not have MRS A or pseudomonas at the time of her admission to 
Pocatello Care and Rehab. In addition, due to the manner in which MRSA and pseudomonas 
are carried and transmitted, one cannot reasonably or naturally infer she contacted MRSA and 
pseudomonas at Pocatello Care and Rehab as a result of negligence based upon the admissible 
evidence in this case. 
The reasons such an inference cannot be made, and why expert testimony is required, 
are numerous. First, Ms. Nield could have contracted these common bacteria that are easily 
transferred on trips she took outside of Pocatello Care and Rehab or as a result of contact with 
visitors or non-Pocatello Care and Rehab medical providers she saw during her stay. CR., Vol. 
II, p. 215, ~ 26.) Ms. Nield left the Pocatello Care and Rehab facility on several occasions 
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between her August 25, 2007 admission and her November 9,2007 wound culture.3 Each visit 
outside of Pocatello Care and Rehab presented a potential for MRSA and/or pseudomonas 
exposure. (R., Vol. II, p. 215, ~ 26.) 
In addition to having left the Pocatello Care and Rehab facility on at least three 
occasions, Ms. Nield was visited by numerous friends and family members during her 
admission. (R., Vol. II, pp. 322-323, 11. 142:10-147:6) Each of these visitors was a potential 
carrier for MRSA and/or pseudomonas. (R., Vol. II, p. 215, ~ 26.) Ms. Nield was also treated 
by physicians who were not employed by Pocatello Care and Rehab during the course of her 
stay at Pocatello Care and Rehab (R., Vol. II, pp. 349-360), and it is possible she was exposed 
to MRSA and/or pseudomonas by one of these providers. (R., Vol. II, p. 215, ~ 26.) 
Second, it is possible Ms. Nield was colonized with MRSA or pseudomonas (having the 
bacteria but not exhibiting any signs or symptoms of infection) at the time of her admission to 
Pocatello Care and Rehab and subsequently infected herself. (R., Vol. II, pp. 211 and 213, ~~ 9 
and 20.) 
Third, it is entirely possible for a resident of a long term or skilled nursing facility to 
develop MRS A or pseudomonas in the absence of any negligence. Specifically, as addressed by 
Dr. Coffman in his affidavit, it is not possible to eradicate MRSA and pseudomonas in health 
care facilities. (R., Vol. II, pp. 211, 213-214, ~~ 11 and 21.) 
3 Ms. Nield left Pocatello Care and Rehab on August 27, 2007 for insertion of a PICC line at 
Portneuf Medical Center (R., Vol. II, pp. 344-345). She also left Pocatello Care and Rehab on 
October 12, 2007 for a dental appointment (R., Vol. II, p. 347) and Ms. Nield left Pocatello 
Care and Rehab in early November to visit the Portneuf Medical Center Gift Shop (R. Vol. II, p. 
331,11. 178:22-179:19.) 
23 
As such, the fact Ms. Nield tested positive for MRSA and pseudomonas while a resident 
of Pocatello Care and Rehab does not give rise to a reasonable or natural inference she 
contracted the bacteria as a result of a breach of the standard of care. 
c. The November 9, 2007 pseudomonas positive test does not support a 
reasonable or natural inference that Ms. Nield's subsequent right hip 
infection and resulting surgeries were proximately caused by the earlier 
infection. 
Ms. Nield alleges that as a result of the negligence of Pocatello Care and Rehab, her left 
leg became infected with pseudomonas, and that such infection subsequently spread to her right 
prosthetic hip, and required a two stage hip revision surgery in May and June 2008. (R., Vol. 
VI, p. 1 044, ~ 6.) Ms. Nield argues expert testimony is not required to establish causation 
because causation can be reasonably inferred based upon the chain of circumstances. Again, 
such an inference is not reasonable in this situation and expert testimony is required to establish 
causation because the causative factors at play are outside the realm of the average juror. 
Again, Dr. Coffman's affidavit explains the relevant medical principles at issue with 
regard to Ms. Nield's pseudomonas infections, and why a juror cannot infer her right 
pseudomonas hip infection was the result of her earlier pseudomonas infection while at 
Pocatello Care and Rehab. 
• It is possible Ms. Nield was among the 10% of the general population who is a 
carrier of pseudomonas in her colon at the time of her admission to Pocatello 
Care and Rehab without showing signs or symptoms, and infected herself. (R., 
Vol. II, p. 213, ~ 16.). 
• Ms. Nield's November 9, 2007 wound culture identified a pseudomonas strain 
with specific susceptibilities to certain antibiotics. (R., Vol. II, p. 370.) 
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• A wound cultures taken after Ms. Nield's positive November 9, 2007 
pseudomonas wound culture, and after she was treated with antibiotics, revealed 
she no longer had pseudomonas in the cultured wound and it appears her 
infection was appropriately treated. (R., Vol. II, pp. 379, 383 and 390-392; R. 
Vol. II, p. 215, ~ 27.) 
• The pseudomonas strain identified in Ms. Nield's right hip in May 2008 had a 
different susceptibility profile than the strain identified in November 7, 2007, 
which indicates the strains of pseudomonas were likely different. (R., Vol. II, p. 
370; R., Vol. II, p. 405; R., Vol. II, p. 215, ~ 27.) 
A juror could not reasonably and naturally infer Ms. Nield's right hip MRSA infection 
in May 2008 was caused by her November 9, 2007 pseudomonas infection. This is the case 
because the lab results related to her November 2007 pseudomonas infection in her left lower 
leg show that she was appropriately treated with antibiotics because pseudomonas was not 
identified on the subsequent wound culture tests taken on November 27, 2007 (R., Vol. II, p. 
379), January 18,2008 (R., Vol. II, p. 383) and March 17, 2008 (R., Vol. II, pp. 390-39~.) In 
addition, when she was again diagnosed with pseudomonas in May 2008, the pseudomonas 
infection in her right hip was likely a different strain of pseudomonas because it had sensitivities 
to antibiotics that her November 2007 pseudomonas infection did not share. (R., Vol. II, p. 370; 
R., Vol. II, p. 405; R., Vol. II, p. 215, ~ 27.) 
In certain limited medical malpractice cases, proximate cause may be reasonably and 
naturally inferred by a juror based upon a chain of circumstances. As established above, 
however, the instant matter requires expert testimony to explain relevant medical and scientific 
principles that remove causation in this case from the average knowledge of a lay person. As 
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such, the District Court appropriately determined Ms. Nield was required to establish causation 
in this action via qualified expert testimony. 
Ms. Nield attempts to argue proximate cause in this case can be reasonably and naturally 
inferred as a result of the chain of circumstances leading up to her damages. However, this case 
is distinguishable from Weeks and Sheridan and instead, is more akin to Swallow, where the 
plaintiffs' expert was not allowed to infer causation, but instead, was required to have direct 
expert testimony regarding causation. In Swallow, the plaintiffs argued: 
[T]hat causation can be established by reasonable inferences drawn from the 
following facts: Mr. Swallow was given a dose of Cipro that was three times the 
dosage intended; his heart attack occurred at the approximate time of the peak 
level of Cipro in his blood; his cardiologist ruled out atherosclerosis, which is the 
most common cause of heart attacks, his cardiologist believed the dose of Cipro 
was unusually high and temporally related to the heart attack; and that he had a 
lack of personal and family history of cardiovascular problems. 
138 Idaho at 597, 67 P.3d at 76. 
In affirming the district court's decision that expert testimony was required to establish 
causation, this Court explained: 
Whether or not the Cipro taken by Mr. Swallow was a cause of his heart attack is 
a matter of science that is far removed from the usual and ordinary experience of 
the average person. A jury, comprised of lay people, is simply not qualified to 
determine that issue without the assistance of expert testimony establishing that 
Cipro can cause a myocardial infarction. Absent such testimony, any finding in 
that regard would be based upon speculation. 
Id. 138 Idaho at 598, 67 P .3d Idaho at 77. 
As such the District Court correctly determined the instant case was similar to Swallow, 
in that causation was based upon scientific and medical principles far removed from the average 
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lay person's knowledge, and that unlike Sheridan or Weeks, direct expert testimony was 
required to establish causation. 
B. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in ruling Ms. Nield failed to come 
forward with qualified expert testimony with regard to causation. 
1. The District Court appropriately exercised its role as gatekeeper with 
regard to admissibility of expert testimony prior to applying liberal 
summary judgment construction to the facts. 
The Court did not impermissibly weigh Ms. Nield's expert witness testimony against 
Pocatello Care and Rehab's expert testimony, but instead, appropriately performed its required 
gatekeeper role of determining what evidence was admissible for purposes of ruling on the 
motion for summary judgment. As stated by the District Court in its Memorandum Decision 
and Order on Reconsideration, "[t]his Court clearly did not weigh Dr. Selznick's affidavit 
against the affidavit of Dr. Coffman. Rather, this Court exercised its gatekeeper role in 
evaluating expert evidence." CR., Vol. VII, p. 1292.) 
With regard to the affidavits of Ms. Nield's experts, such gatekeeper function required 
the District Court to determine if the witnesses were qualified to offer expert opinions and, if so, 
whether there was a scientific basis for such opinions. 
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the district court liberally construes the 
facts and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Brown v. City 
of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 806, 229 P .3d 1164, 1168 (2010). Prior, however, to construing 
the facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, the district 
court acts as a gatekeeper to determine what evidence related to the motion is admissible and 
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may be considered in ruling on the motion. See Weeks v. Eastern Idaho Health Services, 143 
Idaho 834, 836, 153 P.3d 1180, 1182 (2007)(holding "[a]dmissibility of evidence within 
depositions and affidavits in support or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment is a 
threshold question to be addressed before a court can determine the outcome of the summary 
judgment motion."); Foster v. Traul, 145 Idaho 24, 28, 175 P.3d 186, 190 (2007) (holding "the 
question of admissibility of affidavits under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) is a threshold 
question to be analyzed before applying the liberal construction and reasonably inference rules 
required when reviewing motions for summary judgment to determine whether the evidence is 
sufficient to create a genuine issue for trial."). 
As the district court exercises its role as gatekeeper and determines the admissibility of 
evidence, it does not apply the liberal construction and reasonable inferences standard. See 
Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho 32, 37, 156 P.3d 533, 538 (2007)(holding "[t]he liberal construction 
and reasonable inferences standard [applicable to summary judgment] does not apply . .. when 
deciding whether or not testimony offered in connection with a motion for summary judgment 
is admissible.")(emphasis added). Rather, the liberal construction and reasonable inferences 
standard is only applied to those facts and testimony found to be admissible. Id., see also 
Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 871,136 P.3d 338,342 (2006)(holding that the question of 
admissibility of affidavits under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) "is a threshold question to 
be analyzed before applying the liberal construction and reasonable inference rules required 
when reviewing motions for summary judgment" to determine whether the evidence is 
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.). 
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Rule 56( e) requires the Court to determine the admissibility of affidavits in support and 
opposition of summary judgment motions prior to application of the liberal summary judgment 
standard. Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 provides district courts with guidance regarding the 
requirements of admissible expert testimony. Specifically, it provides in pertinent part, "[i]f 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." 
"The foundation for the admission of opinion testimony based upon scientific 
knowledge includes both that the witness is an expert in the field and that there is a scientific 
basis for the expert's opinion." Swallow v. Emergency Medicine of Idaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589, 
593,67 P.3d 68, 72 (2003). 
As such, prior to applying the liberal standard in ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment, the district court must first determine what evidence is admissible and may be 
considered in ruling on the motion. In this case, that involved the Court ruling on the 
admissibility of Ms. Nield's expert witness affidavits. The Court's determination of these 
expert affidavits was not a function of weighing the evidence, but rather, assessing their 
admissibility as required by Rule 56(e) and Idaho Rule of Evidence 702. 
2. Ms. Nield's experts were not qualified to testify regarding causation in this 
action. 
In ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the District Court did not rule that Ms. 
Nield's experts were not qualified to offer causation testimony in this case. Rather, the District 
29 
Court's decision stated "in granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant, this Court does 
not mean to suggest that Dr. Selznick does not possess the knowledge, skills or qualifications to 
address the question of causation, only that his current affidavit does not contain the reasoning 
or methodology required to assist the trier of fact in determining whether PCRC's actions were 
a substantial factor in the Plaintiff contracting MRSA and pseudomonas." (R., Vol. VII, p. 
1237.) However, a review of Ms. Nield's experts' lack of qualifications is relevant in that it 
further sheds light (and possibly explanation) on these experts' lack of scientifically sound 
reasoning or methodology supporting their ultimate causation opinions. 
The test to determine if an expert is qualified is not a rigid one. See Foster v. Traul, 145 
Idaho 24, 29, 175 P.3d 186, 191 (2007). "Formal training is not necessary, but practical 
experience or special knowledge must be shown to bring a witness within the category of an 
expert." Id. 
The Affidavit of Hugh Selznick, M.D., indicates Dr. Selznick is an orthopedic surgeon 
who has practiced medicine in Idaho since 1993 and that he has reviewed Ms. Nield's medical 
records. (R., Vol. VI, p. 1043.) The affidavit is otherwise silent as to any qualifications Dr. 
Selznick has with regard to MRS A, pseudomonas or infectious disease medicine. (R., Vol. VI, 
pp. 1042-1046.) Further a review of Dr. Selznick's attached CV fails to identify any special 
knowledge, skill, experience, training or education with regard to MRSA, pseudomonas or 
infectious disease medicine. (R., Vol. VI, pp. 1084-1086.) 
The Affidavit of Sidney K. Gerber identifies his qualifications as having been a licensed 
nursing facility administrator from 1992 to the present. (R., Vol. VI, pp. 1095-1097.) Mr. 
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Gerber's attached CV indicates he has considerable education, training and expenence ill 
administration, but there is no mention of any training, education or experience with regard to 
MRSA, pseudomonas or infectious disease medicine. CR., Vol. VI, pp. 1107-1108.) 
The Affidavit of Suzanne Frederick states she is a registered nurse in Texas who has 
been practicing since 1983. CR., Vol. VI, pp. 1027-1029.) Although Ms. Frederick's affidavit 
indicates her CV is attached, there is no CV attached to her affidavit in the appellate record. As 
such, there is no evidence in the record regarding Ms. Frederick's experience, training, 
education or knowledge that would qualify her to provide expert testimony regarding MRSA, 
pseudomonas or infectious disease medicine. 
Despite the fact this case deals exclusively with allegations of contraction of MRSA and 
pseudomonas, Ms. Nield failed to come forward with an infectious disease specialist or an 
expert otherwise qualified to discuss infectious disease principles. 
3. Ms. Nield's experts' causation opinions were not arrived at through sound 
reasoning or methodology. 
Pocatello Care and Rehab does not believe any of Ms. Nield's experts were 
appropriately qualified to offer expert causation testimony in this case; however, even if the 
experts were qualified, the District Court appropriately excluded their testimony because their 
causation opinions were not supported by valid reasoning or methodology. 
"In determining whether expert testimony is admissible, a court must evaluate 'the 
expert's ability to explain pertinent scientific principles and to apply those principles to the 
formulation of his or her opinion.' Admissibility, therefore, depends on the validity of the 
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expert's reasoning and methodology, rather than his or her ultimate conclusion ... While the 
court must 'distinguish scientifically sound reasoning from that of the self-validating expert, 
who uses terminology to present unsubstantiated personal beliefs,' it may not 'substitute its 
judgment for that of the relevant scientific community.'" Coombs v. Curnow, 148 Idaho 129, 
140,219 P.3d 453, 464 (2009), citing Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 47,844 P.2d 24, 29 (Ct. 
App. 1992), internal citations omitted. 
Expert testimony is speculative when it "theorizes about a matter as to which evidence is 
not sufficient for certain knowledge." Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 565, 97 P.3d 428,432 
(2004). Expert testimony that is speculative, conc1usory or unsubstantiated by facts in the 
records is of no value to the trier of fact and is inadmissible. Coombs v. Curnow, 148 Idaho 
129, 140,219 P.3d 453, 464 (2009), citing Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 47,844 P.2d 24, 29 
(CL App. 1992). 
Several Idaho Supreme Court cases have further defined the standards applicable to the 
admissibility of expert testimony and the requirement that such opinions be based upon sound 
scientific reasoning. 
In Swallow, the plaintiff offered expert testimony from a pharmacologist that "in her 
opinion the Cipro taken by Mr. Swallow was causally related to his subsequent heart attack 
because of the temporal relationship between taking the Cipro and the heart attack." 138 Idaho 
at 595, 67 P.3d at 74. The trial court ruled a mere temporal relationship was insufficient 
foundation for the expert causation opinion, and the decision was upheld on appeal. Id. 
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In Coombs v. Curnow, the plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action against Drs. 
Curnow and Griffiths after her young son died from cerebral edema following surgery 
performed by the defendants to repair injuries obtained from a dog bite to the son's face. 148 
Idaho 129,219 P.3d 453 (2009). The plaintiff alleged defendants were negligent in their use of 
propofol and that such negligence resulted in in her son's death. The case went to trial and the 
jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The district court reversed the decision on 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, finding that the plaintiffs expert, Dr. Hammer's, 
causation testimony was inadmissible "because it did not meet the standards of scientific 
reliability" with the court pointing out a lack of studies showing propofol was connected with 
edema or related symptoms. ld. 148 Idaho at 142, 219 P .3d at 466. The case was appealed. 
The Supreme Court of Idaho reversed the lower court's decision after exhaustively going 
through Dr. Hammer's qualifications to testify regarding propofol use in pediatric surgeries and 
outlining how his causation opinion was "scientifically reliable" including his ability "to 
provide scientific explanation of the effect Propofol had on Michael and how it caused his 
death." ld. 148 Idaho at 142-143,219 P.3d at 466-477. 
A review of these cases makes clear that the focus for purposes of evaluation 
admissibility of expert testimony is not the ultimate opinion, but whether there is valid 
reasoning and methodology giving rise to the ultimate opinion. 
In determining the admissibility of Ms. Nield's experts' causation opinions, the District 
Court appropriately focused on the reasoning and methodology behind such opinions: 
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There is nothing in Selznick's affidavit that addresses the belief that because of 
the ubiquitous nature of MRSA and pseudomonas the Plaintiff may have been a 
carrier of MRSA and pseudomonas but was not infected at the time of her 
admission. Selznick does not explain why the culture of the leg wound would 
not have produced a false negative and why Plaintiff could only have contracted 
MRSA and pseudomonas while admitted at PCRC ... He does not address the 
other factors that could have been a substantial factor in causing the infections. 
CR., Vol. VII, p. 1237.)(emphasis in original.) 
The District Court went on to state In its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: 
Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration, "the opinions of Dr. Selznick were not based on valid 
methodology or principles and failed to address basic undisputed medical principles with 
respect to MRS A and pseudomonas." (R., Vol. VII, p. 1293.) 
Like the experts in the Swallow matter, none of Ms. Nield's expert witnesses offered 
explanations of pertinent medical principles regarding MRSA, pseudomonas or infectious 
disease medicine. Further, none of Ms. Nield's experts offered valid reasoning or methodology 
for their causation opinions. Rather, each of these three experts offered only conc1usory and 
speculative opinions that fail to address relevant medical and scientific principles. These expert 
opinions are similar to the disallowed opinion in Swallow based merely upon the temporal 
relationship of a heart attack the plaintiff s ingestion of medication. 
a. Dr. Selznick's affidavit failed to explain pertinent medical principles and 
failed to identify valid reasoning or methodology for his causation 
OpInIOns. 
Dr. Selznick's affidavit states "[fJrom reviewing the medical records, Ms. Nield did not 
have any documented pseudomonas infection of [sic] MRS A infection prior to her admission to 
Pocatello Care & Rehabilitation Center." (R., Vol. VI, p. 1043, ~ 4.) Dr. Selznick goes on to 
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state "there is no evidence, in my opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that Ms. 
Nield had MRSA infection prior to entering the Pocatello Care & Rehabilitation Center. 
Objective evidence for same exists, based on her 8/21107 left lower extremity would [ sic] 
cultures which confirmed coagulase staph, not MRSA, whereas subsequent cultures followed 
her hospitalization at Pocatello Care & Rehabilitation Center did grow out MRSA (11109/07; 
1118108; 3113/08)." (R., Vol. VI, p. 1043, , 5.) With regard to pseudomonas, Dr. Selznick's 
affidavit stated "[i]t is my opinion that the colonization of pseudomonas took place during her 
hospitalization and stay at Pocatello Care & Rehabilitation Center." (R., Vol. VI, pp. 1043-
1044,,6.) 
Again, it IS not Dr. Selznick's ultimate OpInIOn the District Court analyzed in 
determining admissibility, but instead, the lack of valid reasoning and methodology used to 
reach such conclusions. 
Dr. Selznick's affidavit indicates Ms. Nield contracted MRS A and pseudomonas at 
Pocatello Care and Rehab based upon: (1) a single wound culture done four days before her 
admission to Pocatello Care and Rehab on August 21, 2007 that did not identify MRSA or 
pseudomonas; (2) a wound culture done after her admission to Pocatello Care and Rehab 
identified MRSA and pseudomonas; and allegations of breaches of the standard of care by 
Pocatello Care and Rehab. (R., Vol. VI, pp. 1042- 1046). 
A review of Dr. Selznick's reports attached to his affidavit reveals slightly more 
reasomng: 
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2. There is no evidence, in my opinion to a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty, that MS. Nield had MRSA infection prior to entering the PocateIlo 
Care & Rehabilitation Center. Objective evidence for same exists, based on her 
8/21107 left lower extremity wound cultures which confirmed coagulase negative 
staph, not MRSA, whereas subsequent cultures following her hospitalization at 
PocateIlo Care & Rehabilitation Center did grow out MRS A (11109/07, 01118/08, 
03/13/08). 
3. The etiology of Ms. Nield's MRS A infection was poor infection control 
measures by the staff at PocateIlo Care & Rehabilitation Center. This was 
substantiated as an appropriate allegation per page 3/8 after an investigative 
report detailing same in a 02119/08 letter to the administrator of PocateIlo Care & 
Rehabilitation Center. 4 
(R., Vol. VI, p. 1064.) 
As to pseudomonas he states "It is highly unlikely, in my opinion, that Ms. Nield 
contracted pseudomonas from any other source other than from her PocateIlo Care & 
Rehabilitation Center hospitalization given aforementioned positive 11109/07 culture results. 
This is a very rare organism to cause total joint infection in general, and given the positive 
11109/07 wound culture for pseudomonas, it is more likely than not, colonization occurred while 
hospitalized at PocateIlo Care and Rehabilitation .... " (R., Vol. VI, p. 1063.) 
Dr. Selznick's reasoning and methodology lacks merit in that it fails to rebut, recogmze 
or even address relevant scientific principles relating to MRSA, pseudomonas and the practice 
4 On January 24, 2008, after Ms. Nield had already left PocateIlo Care and Rehab, the Idaho 
Department of Health and Welfare conducted a complaint investigation at PocateIlo Care and 
Rehab. (R., Vol. V, pp. 929-936.) AlIegation # 3 involved a claim that a patient admitted to 
facility on August 25, 2007 got a MRSA infection "while in the facility due to poor infection 
control measures by the staff." (R., Vol. V, p. 931.) The Health and Welfare letter went on to 
state "Based on the available medical information, which included the resident's records from 
the Hyperbaric Clinic, it could not be determined if the resident developed Methicillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus infection due to poor wound care techniques." (ld.) 
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of infectious disease medicine as testified to by Pocatello Care and Rehab's infectious disease 
expert Dr. Thomas Coffman as explained on pages 7 through 10 above. 
Further, Dr. Selznick's opinions fail to address Dr. Coffman's affidavit indicating that 
the November 9,2007 and May 2008 pseudomonas bacteria appear to be different strains based 
upon their antibiotic susceptibility profiles and the fact several wound cultures taken 
subsequently to November 9, 2007 indicate the pseudomonas infection was successfully treated 
with antibiotics. (R., Vol. II, p. 215, ~ 27.) 
Despite the fact Ms. Nield had from October 8, 2010 to November 29, 2010, to address 
Dr. Coffman's above opinions, Ms. Nield failed to oppose, dispute or even address any of the 
above opinions with her own expert testimony. 
Dr. Selznick's causation opinion is similar to that of the excluded expert in Swallow who 
based their causation testimony on the mere temporal relationship of administration of the 
medication and the heart attack without explaining exactly how such medication would cause a 
heart attack. That is, there is insufficient evidence to support his ultimate causation opinion. 
Ms. Nield improperly relies on Weeks and Coombs, supra, in arguing Dr. Selznick's 
opinions are reasonable and natural inferences properly based on the relevant chain of 
circumstances. However, as discussed in Section A(2) the facts leading up to Ms. Nield's 
positive wound culture test do not give rise to a reasonable or natural inference that Ms. Nield 
did not have MRSA or pseudomonas at the time of her admission to Pocatello Care and Rehab, 
or that she contracted such bacteria as a result of negligence on the part of Pocatello Care and 
Rehab. 
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Again, in Weeks, the chain of circumstances relied upon by the expert was an accidental 
infusion of IV medications into a catheter used to release fluids from the brain cavity and 
subsequent brain damage. As such, there was a clear and understandable chain of 
circumstances leading to a reasonably and naturally inferable result. Further, unlike Dr. 
Selznick who offered no scientific basis for his opinions, the expert's opinion in Weeks provided 
scientific and medical reasoning in helping to explain how an accidental infusion of medications 
into the brain would result in damage: 
Dr. Smith was clear that infusion of this volume of fluid, whether over an eight 
hour period or a period of a few minutes, would cause a deleterious effect "just 
from the fact of fluid going in when it should be going out." This is not 
speculation and is based on more than a temporal concurrence ... While there is 
no exact known effect of the combination of chemicals infused into Evelyn's 
brain, there is scientifically reliable evidence regarding the effect of increased 
intracranial pressure. 
Id. 143 Idaho at 839, 153 P.3d at 1185. 
Similarly, Ms. Nield's reliance on Coombs is misplaced as it is distinguishable from the 
facts of this case. In Coombs, the question was whether there was sufficient evidence to 
establish causation in the death of plaintiff s son following the prolonged use of propofol during 
a surgery. On appeal, this Court determined the lower court erred in finding the plaintiffs 
expert's (Dr. Hammer's) causation opinions were not scientifically reliable. Again, unlike the 
instant case, Dr. Hammer provided actual scientific reasoning and methodology in explaining 
his opinion that the prolonged use of propofol caused plaintiffs son injuries, "he was able to 
provide a scientific explanation of the effect Propofol had on Michael and how it caused his 
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death. He explained the chain of circumstances leading to the cerebral edema and the large role 
Propofol played in those events." Coombs, 148 Idaho at 143,219 P.3d at 467. 
Dr. Selznick's opinion pales in comparison to Dr. Smith's and Dr. Hammer's. Dr. 
Selznick does not cite to any medical or scientific literature to support each causal link in the 
chain of circumstances. Dr. Selznick does not provide any testimony regarding scientific or 
medical principles that would help the jury understand how MRSA and/or pseudomonas are 
contracted, carried, diagnosed or treated. Dr. Selznick does not explain the uses and limitations 
of wound culture tests or screenings. Rather, unlike the expert testimony in Weeks and Coombs, 
Dr. Selznick (and all of Ms. Nield's experts), states Ms. Nield did not have MRSA or 
pseudomonas as of August 25, 2007 because a single wound culture test four days prior was 
negative. Dr. Selznick does not attempt to justify or explain this conclusory assumption with 
relevant medical or scientific principles and his opinion would not help a jury in determining 
causation. Rather, he simply ignores the relevant medical and scientific principles that relate to 
the limitations of such tests. 
As such, Dr. Selznick (and all Ms. Nield's experts') opinion are distinguishable from 
those offered in Weeks and Coombs, and align with the disallowed opinion offered in Swallow 
based solely upon the temporal relationship between administration of a drug and a heart attack. 
Dr. Coffman's affidavit explains why you cannot determine Ms. Nield was not a carrier 
for MRSA or pseudomonas at the time she was admitted to Pocatello Care and Rehab based 
upon the available evidence due to limitations of wound culture tests, the ubiquitous nature of 
both bacteria, how people can be carriers of the bacteria, etc. Dr. Selznick ignores these 
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relevant principles and factors and simply concludes Ms. Nield did not have MRS A or 
pseudomonas based on that August 21, 2007 test. By failing to address any of these relevant 
principles Dr. Selznick (and all of Ms. Nield's experts) failed to provide valid reasoning or 
methodology for his causation opinions. 
b. Ms. Frederick's affidavit failed to explain pertinent medical principles 
and failed to identify valid reasoning or methodology for her causation 
OpInIOns. 
Ms. Frederick's causation opinions suffer from the same failings as Dr. Selznick's. 
Specifically, they are conclusory and speculative and were not arrived at through scientifically 
sound reasoning or methodology. 
Ms. Frederick's opinion: 
Pocatello Nursing [sic] and Rehabilitation Center failed to follow proper 
infection control procedures to prevent Mrs. Nield's MRSA and pseudomonas 
infection ... Mrs. Nield did not have MRS A and pseudomonas when she was 
admitted to Pocatello Nursing [sic] and Rehabilitation Center on August 25, 
2007. However, the records clearly show that she did develop MRSA and 
pseudomonas while she was a resident of Pocatello Nursing (sic) and 
Rehabilitation Center. 
(R., Vol. VI., p. 1028). 
Ms. Frederick's OpInIOn mImICS that of Dr. Selznick and fails to explain relevant 
medical principles regarding MRS A, pseUdomonas or infectious disease medicine and her 
ultimate causation opinions lack valid reasoning or methodology. Ms. Frederick does not 
provide any explanation as to how or why she is able to rely upon the August 21, 2007 wound 
care test result in support of her opinion Ms. Nield was not a carrier of MRSA and/or 
pseUdomonas as of the time of her admission to Pocatello Care and Rehab. She does not 
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discuss the limitations of wound care tests, how people can be carners of MRSA and 
pseudomonas without showing signs or symptoms, or how it is not possible to determine if a 
person is MRSA colonized without a MRSA screen. Nor does Ms. Frederick discuss the chain 
of events giving rise to damages alleged to have been suffered as a result of Ms. Nield's 
pseudomonas infection. Ms. Frederick does not explain how the strains of pseudomonas have 
different antibiotic susceptibility profiles or how her pseudomonas infection appeared to have 
cleared up following antibiotic treatment six months before her hip surgery. Ms. Frederick's 
causation opinions were not arrived at by valid reasoning or methodology, are conclusory, 
would not assist the trier of fact, and were properly excluded. 
c. Mr. Gerber's affidavit failed to explain pertinent medical principles and 
failed to identify valid reasoning or methodology for his causation 
OpInIOns. 
As to causation, Mr. Gerber's affidavit states, "[b lased upon my knowledge, training, 
experience, and upon my review of Ms. Nield's medical records and other relevant documents, 
it is my opinion with more than a reasonable degree of certainty, that there is a reasonable and 
meritorious basis for filing a cause of action against Pocatello Care and Rehabilitation Center." 
(R., Vol. VI, p. 1096, ~ 5.) 
Mr. Gerber's causation statement is unsupported by any reasoning or methodology and 
is nothing but a bald conclusory statement. There is no discussion regarding the characteristics 
of MRSA or pseudomonas, the prevalence of these bacteria, where they are found, how they are 
contracted, how it is possible to be a carrier without showing signs or symptoms, or the 
limitations of a wound culture test in identifying people who are carriers. Instead, as one would 
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expect from a nursmg home administrator, Mr. Gerber's affidavit testimony more fully 
addresses arguments related to standard of care which was not relevant to the instant motion. 
(R., Vol. VI, p. 1096, ~ 4.) 
4. The Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Ms. Nield's experts' 
affidavits for purposes of ruling on summary judgment. 
The District Court recognized the admissibility of expert testimony was a matter within 
its discretion and appropriately laid out the requirements for admissible expert testimony 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 702, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56( e) and relevant case 
law. (R., Vol. VII, pp. 1231-1237.) The District Court acted within the bounds of its discretion 
and legal standards when it evaluated the qualifications and opinions of the experts. 
Specifically, the District Court analyzed the reasoning and methodology employed by Ms. 
Nield's experts: 5 
Selznick makes a conclusion that because the Plaintiff was negative for MRSA 
and pseudomonas at the time of her admission to PCRC, but then tested positive 
for MRSA and pseudomonas prior to her discharge, then she must have 
contracted MRSA and pseudomonas while at PCRC. He does not address the 
other factors that could have been a substantial factor in causing the infections. 
His conclusions are speculative, conclusory, and unsubstantiated in light of the 
numerous ways the Plaintiff may have contracted these infections. 
5 As stated by the District Court in its Memorandum Decision and Order re: Plaintiffs Motion 
for Reconsideration, "this Court properly exercised its gate-keeping role in regard to the 
affidavits of Suzanne Frederick and Sidney K. Gerber submitted by the Plaintiff in further 
support of her burden of proof. This Court conducted the same analysis as explained previously 
and found these affidavits to be similarly insufficient in establishing where and how the Plaintiff 
contracted MRS A and pseudomonas." (R., Vol. VII, pp. 1293-1294.) 
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(R., Vol. VII, p. 1236.) Ultimately, the District Court appropriately exercised its discretion and 
held that Ms. Nield's experts' affidavits did "not contain the reasoning or methodology required 
to assist the trier of fact in determining whether PCRC's actions were a substantial factor in the 
Plaintiff contracting MRS A and pseudomonas." (R., Vol. VII, p. 1237.) 
5. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in holding Dr. Coffman's 
testimony was admissible. 
Dr. Coffman was the only infectious disease expert to offer opinions in support or 
opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Dr. Coffman's affidavit outlined his extensive 
qualifications to offer expert testimony in this case. Further, Dr. Coffman's affidavit explained 
relevant and pertinent medical and scientific principles regarding MRS A, pseudomonas and 
infectious disease medicine, and then incorporated such principles to explain his ultimate 
causation opinions. 
Unlike Ms. Nield's experts, Dr. Coffman is fully qualified to offer expert testimony 
regarding MRSA, pseudomonas and infectious disease medicine. Dr. Coffman is physician 
with over 20 years of experience in infectious disease and is board certified in both internal and 
infectious disease medicine. (R., Vol. II, pp. 21 0, ~~ 1-2.) Dr. Coffman is the Chief of Staff at 
St. Luke's Regional Medical Center, a Chairman of the Infection Control Committee at St. 
Luke's and Co-Chairman of the Infection Control for Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center 
and has practiced medicine since 1990. (Id.) 
As discussed above, Dr. Coffman's affidavit provided pertinent and relevant medical 
and scientific principles regarding MRSA, pseudomonas and infectious disease medicine. 
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After explaining these pertinent and relevant medical and scientific principles, Dr. 
Coffman's affidavit explained why a single wound culture test taken on August 21, 2007 does 
not allow a person to reasonably or naturally infer Ms. Nield did not have MRS A or 
pseudomonas at the time she was admitted to Pocatello Care and Rehab four days later. (R., 
Vol. II, pp. 209-216, ~~ 1-29.) In addition, Dr. Coffman provided sound reasoning and 
methodology in explaining that due the fact Ms. Nield's November 2007 pseudomonas infection 
appears to have resolved with antibiotic treatment shortly after identification, and because the 
strain of pseudomonas found in her right hip in May 2008 was susceptible to different 
antibiotics, it appears these were two different strains of pseudomonas. (R., Vol. II, p. 215, ~ 
27.) 
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Dr. Coffman's expert 
testimony based upon his qualifications, his explanation of relevant medical and scientific 
principles, and his incorporation of such principles in forming his ultimate opinion. 
c. The District Court appropriately granted summary judgment. 
After the District Court correctly determined Ms. Nield was required to submit expert 
testimony for purposes of establishing causation, and that Ms. Nield had failed to come forward 
with admissible expert testimony, the Court appropriately granted summary judgment because 
Ms. Nield was unable to establish an element of her prima facie case. 
The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the non-moving party 
"fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to the 
party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Badell v. Beeks, 115 
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Idaho 101,765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988); see also Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Cantwell 
v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 127, 133, 191 P.3d 205, 211 (2008); Ruffing v. Ada County 
Paramedics, 145 Idaho 943, 188 P.3d 885 (2008). 
To prevail on a medical negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish the following 
elements of proof: "The existence of a relationship to the plaintiff/patient; (b) A duty of care, 
recognized by law requiring the hospital to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (c) A 
breach of that duty by conduct which fails to meet the applicable standard of care; (d) Proximate 
cause, and (e) Actual loss or damage." See generally, Anderson v. Hollingsworth, 136 Idaho 
800, 41 P.3d 228 (2001); Swallow v. Emergency Medicine of Idaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589, 67 
P.3d 68 (2003); Fuller v. Studer, 122 Idaho 251, 833 P.2d 109 (1992). 
Ms. Nield failed to come forward with the required expert testimony to establish 
causation in the instant matter and, therefore, the District Court appropriately granted summary 
judgment. 
D. Ms. Nield is not entitled to attorneys' fees or costs on appeal. 
Ms. Nield has cited to Idaho Code § 12-121 in support of her claim for attorney's fees. 
"The Court is authorized to award attorney fees under this statute if we are left with an abiding 
belief that the appeal was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without 
foundation." Schmechel v. Dille, 148 Idaho 176, 188,219 P.3d 1192, 1204 (2009). Pocatello 
Care and Rehab has not defended the instant appeal frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation. Rather, Pocatello Care and Rehab is defending the instant appeal based upon Ms. 
Nield's own failure to provide the District Court with admissible testimony sufficient to 
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establish proximate cause. As such, Ms. Nield is not entitled to attorney's fees or costs on 
appeal. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should affirm the District Court's decision granting 
summary judgment, and award Pocatello Care and Rehab costs on appeal. 
. ?!/ 
DATED thIS X"day of January, 2012. 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
B y:---.L---,l.Ll4Ar':.1.Lfr---'=-r~~c:......:/~=-----.:=L=--_ 
Kee y E. 
Attorneys or Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the __ day of January, 2012, I caused to be served two 
true copies of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF, by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to each of the following: 
Reed W. Larsen 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
151 North 3rd Avenue, 2nd Floor 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Email: reed~cooper-larsen.com 
Attorneys for PlaintifJlAppeliant 
46 
[g] u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
[g] Email 

